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ADMIRALTY - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - OIL SPILL LIABIL 
ITY - FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON'l'ROL ACT DOES 
NOT PREEMPT STATE STATUTES IMPOSING UNUMITED 
STRICT LIABILITY. STEUART TRANSPORTATION CO. u. 
ALLIED TOWING CORP., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979). 
On February 2, 1976, an oil barge sank in the Chesapeake Bay, 
spilling oil over oyster beds and along the Virginia shoreline.1 
Although combined federal and state damages claimed for cleaning 
up the pollution barely exceeded one-half million dollars,2 the spill 
resulted in the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing Corp. 3 
The court's decision is significant because it could have a direct 
bearing on what would happen were a supertanker disaster to occur 
off the Atlantic Coast and spread oil over the ecologically important 
marshlands or the economically important beach resorts of Mary-
land. 4 
In Steuart, the Fourth Circuit held that the unlimited strict 
liability provision of Virginia's oil pollution statute5 was not 
preempted by the damage ceilings of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA).6 Thus, Virginia was able to recover all its 
costs for cleaning up the oil, even though the federal government's 
recovery was limited to the amount permitted by the FWPCA.7 
The decision resolves one of the two questions raised in dicta but 
not decided by the United States Supreme Court in Askew v. 
1. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'g 
In re Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
2.Id. 
3. 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979). 
4. The financial impact of the pollution caused by an oil supertanker disaster was 
demonstrated when the Amoco Cadiz broke up off the coast of Brittany, France 
in 1978. More than one and a half million barrels of oil were spilled across 
hundreds of miles of coastline in the worst oil pollution incident in history. See 
H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT §27-1, at 694-95 (3d ed. 
1979) [hereinafter cited as BAER]. Damage claims may exceed two billion dollars, 
and the disaster has spawned, according to a maritime law professor, "the 
admiralty case of the century." See Kiechel, The Admiralty Case of the Century, 
FORTUNE, April 23, 1979, at 78 [hereinafter cited as FORTUNE]' 
5. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 417 (formerly VA. CODE §62.1-44.34:2). The act as passed in 
1973 had no limitation or ceiling upon liability. The act has been amended since 
the incident at issue in Steuart and now imposes a limit of five million dollars on 
the liability of a shipowner for a single discharge of oil. See VA. CODE 
§ 62.1-44.34:2(B) (Supp. 1979). 
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1321(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977). The first federal statute 
specifically dealing with oil pollution was the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 431-437 (1964). Subsequently, Congress passed the Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), and amended it creating 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & 
Supp. 1977). The FWPCA was subsequently amended by the Clean Water Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). 
7. 596 F.2d at 613. 
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American Waterways Operators, Inc. 8 The Askew decision left 
unanswered whether state statutes imposing strict liability for oil 
pollution damage would be subject to the FWPCA limitations on 
damage recovery. Also undecided was whether the Limitation of 
Liability Act9 would protect shipowners from unlimited liability to a 
state. 10 
Maryland has a strict liability statute similar to Virginia's.H 
The holding of Steuart indicates that in the event of oil pollution in 
Maryland waters, the state could recover its total cost of cleaning up 
the oil. The question of the Limitation of Liability Act's effect upon 
state statutes remains unresolved because the shipowner in Steuart 
could not qualify for the benefit of the Act. Resolution of this issue 
will determine whether shipowners who qualify under the Act can 
nonetheless be held strictly liable for unlimited damages under state 
statutes. This casenote explores the background of the statutory 
confusion clarified in part by Steuart, and predicts that the 
Limitation of Liability Act will limit recoveries under state strict 
liability statutes. 
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. General Maritime Law 
Admiralty jurisdiction in the United States is expressly granted 
by the Constitution to the federal courts,12 and extends by statute to 
all navigable waters,13 and to damage done to land by vessels.H The 
8. 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
9. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1976). 
10. In Askew, the Supreme Court was not faced with a governmental attempt to 
recover damages for oil pollution caused by a vessel. The Court, therefore, did not 
have a case or controversy before it that required the determination of these two 
issues. Justice Douglas posed the two questions in dicta. 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973). 
11. Compare MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1401 to -1417 (Supp. 1979) with VA. 
CODE § 62.1-44.34:2 (Supp. 1979). Both the Maryland and the Virginia statutes 
are strict liability statutes. 
12. "The judicial power shall extend to ... all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
13. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), the landmark 
case in which Justice Story established the broad range of maritime law in the 
United States and the jurisdiction of the federal courts in maritime matters. 
Specifically, De Lovio held that admiralty jurisdiction in tort extended to all 
navigable waters and in contract to all contracts relating to navigation. 
Furthermore, De Lovio held that when the United States Constitution was 
adopted, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was not limited by English 
statutes that had narrowed its range in England. Consequently, admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction in the United States was to be what it was prior to the 
Statutes of Richard II, 13 Rich. II 1, c.5 (1389); 15 Rich. 112, c.3 (1391), providing 
jurisdiction over "all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and 
navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the sea." 7 F. Cas. at 441. Justice 
Story's conclusion was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Insurance 
Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870). See also N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 1-10 (2d ed. 1974). 
14. Extension of Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976). Historically, admiralty 
jurisdiction did not extend to damage caused by ships to the shore or to shore 
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United States has adopted the whole of the general maritime law, 
not solely that of Great Britain. Is In addition, Congress may alter or 
supplement the nation's maritime law. I6 A major principle of 
maritime law is uniformity, the objective of which is to ensure that 
maritime commerce is not hampered by a myriad of conflicting local, 
state, and nationallawsY In the United States, however, individual 
states are permitted to regulate certain maritime matters, usually 
when the concern is local and no general federal maritime law exists 
affecting the area. I8 There are questions as to how much of its 
admiralty power Congress may constitutionally delegate to the 
states. l9 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has been less 
willing to find conflicts between state and federal laws and more 
willing to allow the states to exercise police powers in regard to 
maritime matters,a! so long as no direct conflict with federal law 
arises. 21 Thus, state legislation and regulation in a narrow range of 
maritime matters has been permitted. 
facilities, but Congress extended the admiralty jurisdiction to include such cases 
by way of this statute. The statute has been upheld as constitutional. See Victory 
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1971); Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963). 
15. See note 13 supra. Justice Story made repeated references to the uniformity and 
international character of maritime law and that these principles were adopted 
by the United States Constitution. 
16. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924) (holding that the Constitution 
empowered Congress to alter, qualify, or supplement the maritime rules). 
17. See note 13 supra. See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 
§§ 1-1 to 1-19 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. 
18. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) 
(holding that when no definition of "warranties" in marine insurance policies 
exists, federal courts should not create one, but should use state definitions 
instead). 
19. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 224 U.S. 205 (1917) (interpreting article three, 
section two of the Constitution to give Congress exclusive power over admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction which the Congress should not delegate to the states). 
Contra, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) 
(denying the contention that a Florida oil pollution statute was preempted by the 
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, and reversing a district court decision 
that quoted Jensen in supporting the contention). See American Waterways 
Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971). See aLso, Scherr, 
Admiralty's Power in re Oil Pollution: The Ability of the State to Set More 
Stringent Penalties Than Those of the Federal Government, 7 NAT. RES. LAw. 
635 (1974). 
20. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (state statute 
regulating smoke emitted by vessel held to be valid exercise of state police 
power). 
21. Even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a 
particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually 
conflicts with a valid federal statute. A conflict will be found "where 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility" ... or where the state "law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." 
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978). 
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B. The Limitation of Liability Act 
In 1851, Congress enacted the Limitation of Liability Act22 on 
behalf of American shipowners, who did not have the protection 
from in personam suits enjoyed by their British competitors.23 
British admiralty courts had only in rem jurisdiction and thus, 
under British law, a shipowner's liability for damages caused by his 
ship was limited to its value. 24 The theory was that a shipowner 
should not be held personally liable for the actions of his ship over 
which he had no control. The Act, therefore, allows a shipowner to 
limit his liability to the post-casualty value of the ship plus freight 
then pending if he can prove an absence of "privity or knowledge" 
concerning the negligence that led to the 10ss.25 Although a potent 
weapon for shipowners desiring to avoid liability, the Act has drawn 
a barrage of criticism in recent years. 26 American courts in this 
century have been increasingly reluctant to allow shipowners the 
protection of the Act because, with the prevalence of corporate forms 
preventing personal liability and modern insurance protection, the 
protective objective of the Act seems obsolete.27 Another reason for 
22. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). 
23. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at § 10-2. 
24. Id. See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admiralty § 1-2 (1962). 
25. The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, damage or 
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage or 
forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowl-
edge of such owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount or value 
of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then 
pending. 
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976) (emphasis added). 
As used in the statute, the meaning of the words 'privity or knowledge,' 
evidently is a personal participation of the owner in some fault, or act of 
negligence, causing or contributing to the loss, or some personal 
knowledge or means of knowledge, of which he is to avail himself of a 
contemplated loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it. 
Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co., 15 F. Cas. 884, 887 (C.C. Cal. 1877) 
(No. 8,506) (emphasis added), aff'd, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 541 (1881). See also, 
Daniels v. Trawler Sea·Rambler, 294 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1968); 3 E. BENEDICT, 
ADMIRALTY §§41-47 (7th ed. 1975); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at §§ 10-1 
to 10-49; Volk & Cobbs, Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953 (1977). The 
effect of the Limitation of Liability Act is to limit the vessel owner's liability by 
establishing a fund (or maximum liability ceiling) that represents the total 
amount of money against which claims can be made by creditors ofthe vessel or 
those damaged by the vessel's operation. 
26. See In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282, 285 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (for a collection of works 
and commentaries criticizing the Act); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at 
821-24. 
27. The Supreme Court said in 1954 that "[m]any of the conditions in the shipping 
industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail." 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954). 
Such an attitude reflects, it is suggested, not so much hostility to the 
shipping industry as a recognition of the fact that the Limitation Act, 
passed in the era before the corporation had become the standard form of 
business organization and before present forms of insurance protection 
(such as Protection and Indemnity insurance) were available, shows 
increasing signs of economic obsolescence. 
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, § 10-4, at 822. 
1979] Steuart Transp. v. Allied Towing 117 
this reluctance is the development of modem communications 
allowing a shipowner to have direct control over his ships much of 
the time.28 
In application, the Act can result in absurd consequences, as it 
did in 1967 when the supertanker Torrey Canyon broke up off of 
Land's End, England, causing millions of dollars of damage to the 
beaches of England and France. The shipowner, in preliminary 
proceedings in a United States District Court, was able to obtain 
approval for a liability fund of fifty dollars, which represented the 
value of one salvaged lifeboat.29 There was an eventual cash 
settlement of about three million British pounds, but much of the 
cost of the disaster was borne by England and France.30 
In addition, the Act has been employed by yacht owners to limit 
their liability.31 Commentators have pointed out the irony of the use 
of the statute, designed to encourage maritime commerce, by 
pleasure boat owners despite their ownership of substantial liability 
insurance.32 Yacht owners wealthy enough to hire someone else to 
run their vessels can avoid either "privity or knowledge" and thus 
utilize the Act to avoid in personam liability. Such an owner enjoys a 
freedom from liability under the Act unrelated to any legitimate 
maritime purpose.33 
C. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
The Torrey Canyon disaster spawned an international effort to 
provide compensation for the cost of cleaning up oil spills. 
International conventions were drafted34 and the shipping industry 
28. See In re Den Norske Amerikalinje AlS, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 
(6th Cir. 1969) (shipowner held to a duty to wield operational control over vessel 
because of presence of radio equipment on the vessel). Contra, Yolk & Cobbs, 
Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953, 960 (1977) (pointing out that a vessel 
owner capable of radio contact with his ship at sea is in the unenviable position 
of either attempting to exercise operational control of a ship at sea in an 
emergency situation via radio communications or sitting by and assuming 
liability for such failure). 
29. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. N.Y. 1968), modified, 406 
F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1968). 
30. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, § 10-4(b), at 824 n.131. 
31. See, e.g., Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); In re Guggenheim, 76 F. Supp. 50 
(E.D.S.C. 1947). 
32. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at 883. 
33. See, e.g., In re Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Tex. 1967). See also Richards v. 
Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1975) (limitation in yacht 
cases "is in conflict with our senses of justice and appropriateness"). 
34. International efforts began shortly after the Torrey Canyon disaster to change 
international laws regarding the liability for such oil spills, and to provide for 
cooperation when one occurred. The International Convention Relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties was ratified 
by the United States Senate in September, 1971, see Pub. L. No. 93·248 (1974). 
Ratifying nations agreed that anyone of them could take immediate steps when 
threatened by oil pollution from a ship belonging to another, within certain 
limits. See BAER, supra note 4, § 27-2, at 696-97. 
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established its own fund for dealing with oil pollution.3s The United 
States Senate refused to ratify the most significant of these 
conventions, however, believing its limitations on recovery were too 
low.3s Instead, Congress enacted the Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970 and amended it in 1~72, creating what is now the 
FWPCA. 37 The Act authorizes the development of a federal plan to 
clean up oil spills and provides for recovery by the federal 
government of its cleanup costS.38 With few exceptions, liability is 
absolute. 39 The Act, however, now limits the liability of inland 
barges for an oil spill to $125.00 per gross ton or $125,000.00, 
whichever is greater, and that of other vessels to $150.00 per gross 
ton or $250,000.00, whichever is greater, so long as the discharge was 
not willful. 40 
The FWPCA contains two ambiguous sections, which courts 
have had difficulty interpreting. One is section 1321(£)(1), which 
declares that the limits established by the section are effective 
against shipowners "notwithstanding any other provision of law." 
Some commentators believe that the Act thus supercedes the 
Limitation of Liability Act by creating new limits on liability and 
thus prevents a shipowner from limiting his liability by establishing 
35. In 1969 tanker owners formed a compensation plan entitled Tanker Owners' 
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (TO-
V ALOP). This arrangement was superceded in 1975 by the Civil Liability 
Convention (CLC), an international treaty, under which shipowners have 
absolute liability for oil pollution. Liability limits were established, however, and 
were about $16.7 million at the time of the Amoco Cadiz sinking. A private 
agreement among companies shipping oil, Contract Regarding an Interim 
Supplement to Tanker Owner Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) could 
provide an additional $13.3 million. 
The CLC convention was not ratified by the United States Senate because 
the Senate believed the limitation figures were too low. Damage estimates in the 
Amoco Cadiz disaster range as high as $2 billion, and thus the existing liability 
provisions are inadequate. Efforts are underway to increase the limits under the 
CLC and CRISTAL plans. 
Making matters more complicated for all parties are limits on insurance 
policies shipowners can carry. The Amoco Cadiz was insured for only $50 
million. These limits have since been raised to $100 million. It seems obvious, 
however, that presently there are no existing means of providing that the cost of 
such disasters be paid by those responsible. See 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY, 
§§ 115-119 (7th ed. 1975); BAER, supra note 4, at 696-99; GILMORE & BLACK, 
supra note 17, § 1O-4(b); Higgins, Pollution: International Conventions, Federal 
and State Legislation, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1328 (1979) (discussing proposed federal 
legislation to create a "superfund"). 
36. See 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY §§ 115-119 (7th ed. 1975). 
37. See note 6 supra. 
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i)(1) (1972). 
39. There is no liability if the oil spill was caused by: (1) An act of God; (2) An act of 
war; (3) Negligence on the part of the United States government; or (4) An act or 
omission by a third party. Id. at § 1321(f). 
40. If the conduct causing the spill is determined to be "willful" the vessel owner is 
subject to liability without limitation. See note 6 supra. See also Healy & 
Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 1 
J. MAR. LAW & COM. 537 (1970) (the definitive work on the background of the 
Act). See generally 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 111 (7th ed. 1975); DOLGIN & 
GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682-771 (1974). 
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his lack of "privity or knowledge."41 This question has not been 
litigated beyond the federal district court level and the decisions 
there are not definitive.42 
The other controversial section of the FWPCA is 1321(0)(2), 
which states that Congress disclaims any intention to preempt state 
statutes "imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the 
discharge of oil." More than twenty states have statutes imposing 
liability in various forms for oil spills in their waters.43 Many of 
these statutes, including Maryland's, impose strict liability with no 
limitation upon the amount a shipowner might have to pay a state 
for cleaning up an oil spill.44 The question regarding this section is 
41. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 1O-4(b); 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 112 
(7th ed. 1975). 
42. See In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (New York 
statute imposing-strict liability for oil spills held to be subject to the Limitation 
of Liability Act in a case involving the grounding of an oil barge); In re Harbor 
Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971) (subjecting Maryland's strict 
liability statute to the Limitation of Liability Act). 1"1 Harbor Towing, however, 
Maryland brought its action under the state's strict liability statute and the 
Wreck Statute, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), which requires the owner of a vessel sunk 
in a "navigable channel" to mark the sunken vessel and make diligent attempts 
to remove it. The possible impact upon the Wreck Statute of the FWPCA, which 
had just taken effect at the time of the Harbor Towing decision, was not 
considered except in an aside at the end of the opinion. The FWPCA's possible 
impact on the Limitation of Liability Act was not considered in either case. 
Compare United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. La. 1978) 
with United States v. M/V Big Sam, 454 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. La. 1978). In both 
cases the issue was whether the FWPCA superceded the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act (The Refuse Act) of 1899. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411-412 (1970). In 
MIV Big Sam, which involved a collision between a tug and a barge, the court 
held that there was no conflict between the statutes and that the FWPCA did not 
supercede the Refuse Act. In Dixie Carriers, which involved a similar factual 
scenario, the court held that under certain situations the FWPCA did supercede 
the Refuse Act. The Dixie Carriers court also determined that the FWPCA was 
the federal government's exclusive remedy for the recovery of costs of an oil spill 
cleanup; but that the Refuse Act could nonetheless be used to recover for 
damages to property arising from an oil spill. The court in Steuart adopted the 
reasoning of the court in Dixie Carriers, and held that the FWPCA was the 
federal government's exclusive remedy for its costs of cleaning up an oil spill. 596 
F.2d at 615. 
Damage to property was not an issue in Steuart. But see In re Allied Towing 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979). In Allied Towing the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia could 
impose liability upon Allied for the loss of waterfowl destroyed when another of 
Allied's barges sank in the Chesapeake Bay. The court stated that "the Clean 
Water Act of 1977 amendments to the FWPCA did not preempt state created 
liability for oil spills, and that no part of Virginia's claim under state law for 
damage to its natural resources" was satisfied by Allied's settlement with the 
federal government and Allied's subsequent discharge from liability under the 
FWPCA. 478 F. SuPP. at 404. 
43. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). See also note 
71 infra. 
44. The Maryland Port Administration and the department shall charge and 
collect a compensatory fee from the person responsible for any oil 
spillage. This fee shall cover the cost of labor, equipment operation, and 
material necessary to eliminate the residue of oil spillage, and the cost of 
restoring the area damaged by the spillage to its original condition. 
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1408 (1974). 
120 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 9 
whether by declining to preempt state statutes Congress was 
protecting those statutes from the Limitation of Liability Act. This 
question has never been decided by any court. 
D. The Askew Decision 
Florida was one of the first states to enact strict liability 
legislation governing oil SpillS,45 and the statute was quickly 
challenged.46 The federal district court declared in American 
Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew that the state act was 
unconstitutional,47 relying on the landmark case of Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Jensen48 to hold that the Florida statute conflicted with the 
supremacy of federal maritime law. The court went on to note that to 
allow states to regulate shipping through such statutes would 
destroy the principle of uniformity.49 In addition, the district court 
observed that even if the state law were authorized by the FWPCA, 
such authorization would be an impermissable delegation of power 
by Congress. 50 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the district court in 
an unanimous decision,51 holding that the statute was a valid 
exercise of Florida's police power in an area not preempted by 
federal law. The Court specifically declined to decide both whether 
the state's costs would have to be included within the limitation of 
the FWPCA and whether a shipowner could escape liability under a 
state statute through use of the Limitation of Liability Act.52 Indeed, 
45. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244 § 12, 1970 Fla. 
Laws 740 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. §376.12 (West Supp. 1979». For a 
comprehensive study of the Florida legislation and changes that occurred 
subsequent to the Askew decision when maritime interests began pulling out of 
Florida (limitations on liability were eventually adopted) see Barrett & Warren, 
History of Florida Oil Spill Legislation, 5 FLA. ST. L. REV. 310 (1977). See also 
Maloof, Oil Pollution: Cleaning Up the Legal Mess, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 605 
(1976). 
46. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 
1971). The only other state pollution statute challenged in court prior to Steuart 
was The Maine Coastal Conveyance of Oil Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 541-557 
(Supp. 1977). For a thorough discussion of the Maine act, see Comment, Liability 
for Maritime Oil Pollution, A Comparison of the Maine Coastal Conveyance Act 
with Federal Liability Provisions, 29 ME. L. REV. 47 (1977). The Maine statute 
was upheld by the Maine Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court 
refused to hear the case on appeal. See Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental 
Improvement Comm., 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 
(1973). 
47. 335 F. Supp. at 1250-51. 
48. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
49. 335 F. Supp. at 1248. 
50. Id. at 1249. 
51. Askewv v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
52. Id. at 332. 
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the court could not have decided these issues because Askew did not 
present a factual scenario in which a state was proceeding against 
the owner of a vessel to recover damages for the cost of cleaning up a 
spill. In Askew, the plaintiff organization represented the interests 
of licensees of oil terminal facilities. This organization requested the 
federal court to enjoin the enforcement of the Florida statute, 
alleging that the FWPCA preempted the Florida requirement that all 
licensees of such terminal facilities carry insurance or post bonds to 
show their ability to pay state damage claims in the event of an oil 
spill. 53 
The Askew Court considered the Solicitor General's argument 
that the Limitation of Liability Act preempts the Florida statute "so 
far as vessels are concerned," but reasoned that because the state 
statute dealt with the regulation of terminal "facilities," not vessels, 
it thus did not conflict with the Limitation of Liability Act.54 The 
decision did not mention In re Harbor Towing Corp.,55 the one lower 
court decision that dealt with the effect of the Limitation of Liability 
Act upon state oil pollution statutes. In Harbor Towing, Chief Judge 
Northrop of the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland held that the Limitation of Liability Act preempted 
Maryland's .strict liability oil pollution statute,56 and allowed the 
owner of a barge that spilled oil into the Baltimore harbor to limit 
his liability to $33,000.00, despite the $500,000.00 in damages caused 
by the spill. 57 But the question of whether the FWPCA preempted the 
Limitation of Liability Act and permitted the state full recovery was 
not considered in Harbor Towing because the FWPCA had just been 
enacted at the time of the decision. 
The Supreme Court could not address the effect of the liability 
ceilings of the FWPCA upon Florida's strict liability statute, because 
in Askew there were no damages being claimed as the result of an oil 
spill. Thus, there was no conflict between state claims for damages 
and the federal ceilings of the FWPCA. Askew simply held that a 
state could pass legislation imposing liability upon those polluting 
its waters.58 
53. [d. at 331. See also The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, supra 
note 45, at § 14. 
54. [d. at 331. The Court distinguished the Limitation of Liability Act's exclusive 
control over damage caused by "vessels" from the Florida statute's regulation of 
"facilities." 
55. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971). 
56. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). 
57. 335 F. Supp. at 1152. 
58. The Askew case has been the subject of extensive commentary and criticism. The 
Court could not address the major issues and had to leave unanswered a number 
of questions clearly likely to cause further litigation, which they did. See 
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 17, at § 10-4(b); 3 E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 113 
(7th ed. 1975); Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil 
Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 524, 543-46 (1974); Sisson, Oil 
Pollution Law and the Limitation of Liability Act: A Murky Sea for Claimants 
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II. THE STEUART CASE 
Steuart Transportation Company's oil tank barge STC-101, 
loaded with 19,700 gallons of oil59 and in tow of Allied's tug Falcon, 
sank four miles south of the Smith Point light on February 2, 1976, 
causing an oil spill over miles of Chesapeake Bay oyster beds and 
Virginia shoreline. Steuart sought to limit its liability by qualifying 
under the Limitation of Liability Act. The trial court found, however, 
that Steuart's managers and superintendents were negligent in their 
inspection of the barge, and that the barge sank because of various 
defective conditions that adequate inspection would have revealed.60 
Thus, the trial court held that Steuart could not establish a lack of 
privity or knowledge and therefore could not limit its liability. 
Steuart sought, in the alternative, the protection of the 
limitation levels of the FWPCA, which at that time would have es-
tablished liability at $122,300.00, computed at $100.00 per gross ton 
of the barge.61 Steuart also asked the court to combine the federal 
and state cleanup costs in order to subject Virginia's, as well as the 
federal government's, costs to the limits of the FWPCA. Had Steuart 
been successful, the Commonwealth of Virginia would have 
recovered only a pro rata portion of its expenses, because the 
combined costs of $521,000.00 substantially exceeded the FWPCA 
limit. The trial and appellate courts held both that Steuart's liability 
to the federal government was subject to the limits of the FWPCA,62 
and more importantly that Virginia's claims were outside the 
FWPCA and thus not subject to the FWPCA limits. 
Steuart argued that the state statute imposing unlimited strict 
liability conflicted with the liability limitation of the FWPCA, thus 
raising one of the questions left unanswered by Askew.63 The Fourth 
Circuit, however, relying upon the recent Supreme Court case of Ray 
v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,64 applied the principle that "[fJederal 
legislation does not supercede a state statute based on the police 
powers unless Congress has manifested a clear intention to preempt 
the field or the state statute actually conflicts with the federal 
law."65 The court then discussed the legislative intent behind Section 
1321(0)(2) of the FWPCA, which the court determined disclaims any 
Against Vessels, 9 J. MAR. LAw & COM. 285, 303-15 (1978; Swan, Challenges to 
Federalism: State Legislation Concerning Marine Oil Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
437 (1972). 
59. 435 F. Supp. at 800. 
60. [d. at 803. A worn ventilator cowling broke loose flooding the stern pump room, 
and unremoved scupper plugs caused cargo hatch spill rails to retain water. 
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1976). The current limit is $125.00 per gross ton for inland 
barges. 
62. Thus ruling against the federal government's contention that Steuart's 
negligence was willful. See note 40 supra. 
63. 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
64. 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978). 
65. 596 F.2d at 620. 
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attempt by Congress to restrict state legislation regarding oil spill 
liability.66 It also dismissed as "too attenuated" Steuart's claim that 
the limit of the FWPCA was imposed by Congress in order that 
shipowners could obtain the insurance coverage required by the 
Act.67 The court then concluded that Virginia could recover its 
cleanup costs directly from Steuart, independent of the FWPCA 
limitations. 
In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that Steuart could not 
qualify under the Limitation of Liability Act.68 Therefore, the Fourth 
Circuit did not decide whether, had Steuart qualified, the Act would 
have limited Virginia's recovery under its statute, although the court 
appeared to assume that it would.69 In contrast, the trial court had 
observed in a footnote that the language "notwithstanding any 
other provision of law" in the FWPCA might preclude application of 
the Limitation of Liability Act to all claims for oil spill cleanup 
costs. 70 The question remains unresolved by the courts. 
III. THE MARYLAND STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE 
The holding in Steuart indicates that, notwithstanding the 
FWPCA, Maryland's strict liability statute could allow the state to 
recover all the costs it incurs in cleaning up oil spilled in Maryland 
waters, because the key provisions of the Maryland statute are 
similar to the Virginia statute construed by the Steuart court.71 The 
statute provides in part that the Maryland Port Administration and 
the Department of Natural Resources, 
66. In 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2), Congress expressly disclaimed any intention to 
preempt the states "from imposing any requirement or liability with 
respect to the discharge of oil." Congress recognized the states' primary 
responsibility to eliminate pollution, and it directed the President to 
prepare a national contingency plan for the removal of oil spills that 
would coordinate the efforts of federal and state agencies. Having 
acknowledged the importance of state efforts in this area, Congress did 
not hobble the states by subjecting their claims for removal costs to the 
limitation in the [Federal Water] Pollution [Control] Act. The House 
conference report, commenting on § 1321(0)(2)'s antecedent in the Water 
[Quality Improvement] Act, explained that a state could impose 
"additional requirements and penalties" for the discharge of oil into the 
waters of the state. 
596 F.2d at 620 (citations omitted). See note 82 infra. 
67. There are some commentators who believe this is not an attenuated argument. 
See, e.g., Maloof, supra note 45 (present limits on insurance of oil tankers are 
woefully inadequate for the potential damage an oil spill can cause). 
68. See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
69. 596 F.2d at 615-16. 
70. 435 F. Supp. at 806 n.8. This conflicts with the argument and assumption of the 
Solicitor General commented upon by the United States Supreme Court in 
Askew. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
71. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§8-1401 to -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). More than 
twenty states have similar legislation. The statutes are collected at 3 E. 
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 113 (7th ed. 1975). 
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shall charge and collect a compensatory fee from the person 
responsible for any oil spillage. This fee shall cover the cost 
of labor, equipment operation, and material necessary to 
eliminate the residue of oil spillage and the cost of restoring 
the area damaged by the spillage to its original condition. 72 
Other sections of the statute provide for a contingency fund for 
cleanup expenses,73 bonds,74 and with certain exceptions, criminal 
penalties. 75 The statute imposes strict civil liability on any party 
responsible for an oil spill in Maryland waters and requires that 
party to compensate the state in full for the state's cleanup costs. 
More recently, In re Allied Towing COrp.76 takes Steuart one step 
further and indicates that the restoration clause of the Maryland 
statute probably will allow the state to collect damages for injury to 
its natural resources resulting from an oil spill. The shadow of In re 
Harbor Towing Corp.,77 however, casts doubts upon the Maryland 
statute's ability to reach beyond the potentially small fund that 
could be established by a vessel owner under the Limitation of 
Liability Act. Thus, the effect of the Limitation of Liability Act upon 
state statutes, left undecided by Askew, remains an important 
undecided question following Steuart. 
IV. THE REMAINING QUESTION 
In Steuart, the Fourth Circuit found that Congress' intent in 
enacting the FWPCA was to provide the federal government a 
remedy for oil spill damage without preempting state statutes.78 As a 
result, there are now two areas of potential liability for the owner of 
a vessel responsible for an oil spill. If the federal government incurs 
expense, the shipowner will be liable for the government's costs up to 
the FWPCA limits. Steuart implies that the "notwithstanding any 
other provision of law" language of the FWPCA and its accompany-
ing legislative history79 effectively supersedes the Limitation of 
72. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §8-1408 (1974). 
73. Id. at § 8-1411. The $1,000,000.00 limit, in light of the enormous potential of 
damage carried by a major spill, may be too low if supertankers begin coming 
closer to Maryland waters. 
74. Except for a vessel carrying or receiving 25 barrels or less of oil, any 
vessel, whether or not self-propelled, in or entering upon the waters of 
the state to discharge or receive a cargo of any bulk oil in the state shall 
post a bond of $100 per gross ton of vessel with either the Maryland Port 
Administration or the department. 
Id. at § 8-1407(a). 
75. Id. at § 8-1410. This section provides exceptions in cases of "emergency 
imperiling life or property, unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding." 
76. 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979). See note 42 supra. 
77. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971). 
78. 596 F.2d at 620. See also, H.R. REp. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted 
in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2712, 2727. 
79. 596 F.2d at 615. See also, H.R. REP. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 
reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2691, 2702. 
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Liability Act in the area of liability to the federal government. 
Steuart, however, leaves undecided whether, were the same oil spill 
to cause a state to incur expense, liability to the state would be 
governed by state unlimited strict liability statutes, or whether the 
shipowner would be able to limit liability by qualifying under the 
Limitation of Liability Act. This question is critical because, without 
the protection of the Limitation of Liability Act, shipowners could 
face massive liability were a major oil spill to occur. With continued 
reliance upon foreign oil shipped to the United States by tanker, the 
likelihood of a major spill remains high. A major spill that spread 
over the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, or along the Atlantic Coast, 
could cause immeasurable damage to natural resources. A Torrey 
Canyon or Amoco Cadiz supertanker disaster off Cape Hatterab, for 
example, where many other ships have sunk, could create liability 
that no shipowner could bear. 
Although both Steuart and Allied Towing held that the states 
could avoid the limits of the FWPCA and proceed against the vessel 
owners for all the damages the states incurred, in neither case was it 
settled whether the Limitation of Liability Act might limit a state's 
recovery, because neither vessel owner could qualify under that Act. 
Similarly, the FWPCA had only been recently enacted when Judge 
Northrop found in Harbor Towing that Maryland could not recover 
more than the damage ceiling imposed by the Limitation of Liability 
Act. Therefore, Judge Northrop did not consider whether the 
FWPCA renders the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable to 
situations in which a state sues the vessel owner. so 
On one hand, the Limitation of Liability Act's declining 
popularity among courts and commentators supports a prediction 
that it will be found not to preempt state unlimited strict liability 
statutes. Indeed, in recent years shipowners have found it increas-
ingly difficult to establish the lack of "privity or knowledge" that is 
the prerequisite to limitation of liability.81 On the other hand, an 
even stronger argument can be made that the Limitation of Liability 
Act will check the unlimited liability imposed by some state oil spill 
statutes. Analysis of the Steuart decision and the FWPCA's 
provisions suggests the Act will limit recovery under state statutes. 
Steuart held that state recoveries for oil spill damages are not 
limited by the FWPCA because that Act applies only to recovery by 
the federal government. Inasmuch as the FWPCA provides the 
federal government's sole remedy for oil spills, the Steuart court 
reasoned that it necessarily must be solely a limitation on a 
shipowner's federal liability. Thus, if the FWPCA applies only to the 
federal government, then it logically follows that the FWPCA 
superceded the Limitation of Liability Act only with respect to 
liability to the federal government. 
80. See note 42 supra. 
81. See note 27 supra. 
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Similarly, the Congressional intent manifest in section 
1321(0)(2) indicates that the FWPCA does not preempt state oil spill 
legislation.82 Other language in the Act justifies the inference that it 
supercedes the Limitation of Liability Act only with respect to 
federal liability. Section 1321(f)(1) establishes the federal govern-
ment's right to collect damages and limits the amount of recovery. In 
addition, section 1321(f)(1) stipulates that it is effective "notwith-
standing any other provision of law." This language can refer only 
to the federal right and its limits. If the states are protected from the 
limits of the FWPCA because its limits apply only to the federal 
government, then whether the FWPCA supercedes the Limitation of 
Liability Act as to the federal government has no relevance to the 
application of the Limitation of Liability Act to state statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although there has been a great deal of commentary since 
Askew, until Steuart no case had resolved the questions that 
decision left unanswered: (1) whether the limits of the FWPCA apply 
to the states, and (2) whether state recoveries may be limited by the 
Limitation of Liability Act. The Fourth Circuit decided, in a well-
reasoned opinion, that state recoveries are not limited by the 
FWPCA. The result, at least in the Fourth Circuit, will be that 
shipowners whose vessels spill oil into the waters of states that 
impose strict and unlimited liability for such spills will have to pay 
those states' full cleanup costs. In addition, as a result of Allied 
Towing, shipowners will be responsible for damage to natural 
resources, unless they are able to use the Limitation of Liability Act 
to establish a fund limited to the remaining value of the vessel. 
Although the federal government's recovery of its costs is 
limited, and Virginia has amended its statute to provide for a limit 
on liability, the Maryland statute continues to impose unlimited 
liability. Consequently, in the future, Maryland may well engage in a 
major legal battle to resolve whether the Limitation of Liability Act 
limits state damages in oil spill cases. The Steuart decision provides 
a framework for analysis of that inevitable conflict. Such analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the Limitation of Liability Act retains 
vitality when state strict liability statutes are applied against 
shipowners. Thus, when a vessel owner has neither "privity or 
knowledge," a state's recovery under its strict liability statute, no 
matter how extensive the damage, might be limited to the value of a 
82. See text accompanying note 66 supra. The statute provides in pertinent part as 
follows: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State ... 
from imposing ... liability with respect to the discharge of oil ... into any 
waters in such State." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2) (1976). 
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single lifeboat, as in the Torrey Canyon disaster, under the 
provisions of the 129-year old Limitation of Liability Act. 
Daniel C. Riker 
